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Summary: This paper examines prisoner enfranchisement in the Republic of
Ireland and United Kingdom. Despite being close neighbours, having similar legal
and political traditions, both being members of the Council of Europe and European
Union, and latterly politicians tending towards similar rhetoric on ‘law and order’, the
debates and outcome in the two states have been significantly different on prisoner
enfranchisement. The paper considers why the two states took such diverging
approaches. Not only did the attitudes of governments and legislators differ on
prisoner enfranchisement, but the debates revealed variance in portrayal of prisoners.
Media interest was very different in the two states and discussions over parliamentary
sovereignty, European influences, and judicial activism were central to the outcome
of the deliberations on prisoner enfranchisement. 
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Introduction
Prisoner enfranchisement remains one of the few contested electoral
issues in twenty-first-century democracies. It is at the intersection of
punishment and representative government. In recent decades, prisoner
enfranchisement has been a source of controversy in many countries,
from Israel to South Africa and Australia to Canada (Ewald and
Rottinghaus, 2009). 
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Outside the United States of America (Manza and Uggen, 2006;
Uggen et al., 2012), prisoner enfranchisement has caused most debate in
the United Kingdom (Easton, 2011). In December 2006 the United
Kingdom’s Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA; 2006,
Foreword) launched a consultation process with the statement that ‘The
government is firm in its belief that individuals who have committed an
offence serious enough to warrant a term of imprisonment should not be
able to vote while in prison’. Some days earlier, the Oireachtas1 had
quietly introduced legislation to allow prisoners to vote.
This paper will examine why governments and legislators in the
United Kingdom have resisted and their counterparts in the Republic of
Ireland have embraced prisoner enfranchisement. It then explores other
issues that become embroiled in the deliberations about prisoners’ access
to the franchise. The paper concludes by considering whether this
indicates more than a different attitude to prisoner enfranchisement, but
something deeper in penal policy. 
Republic of Ireland 
Prior to the establishment of the Free State, legislation governing
prisoners and voting was covered by the Forfeiture Act 1870, which
barred from voting anyone serving a sentence over 12 months.
Legislators in the early decades of the state were reluctant to deal with
penal reform in general (Rogan, 2011; Tomlinson, 1995) and were even
less interested in prisoners’ rights (Behan, 2014). 
Even though no law was introduced to bar prisoners’ access to the
franchise, before the passing of the Electoral (Amendment) Act 2006,
Irish prisoners were in an anomalous position. They could register to
vote, but there was no facility to allow them to cast their franchise. The
registration of prisoners as electors was specifically set out in Section
11(5) of the Electoral Act 1992, which provided that: ‘Where on the
qualifying date, a person is detained in any premises in legal custody, he
shall be deemed for the purposes of this section to be ordinarily resident
in the place where he would have been residing but for his having been so
detained in legal custody.’ With little likelihood of ballot boxes being
provided in prisons and no procedure to allow postal voting, the
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registration was moot. However, it left open the possibility that if a
serving prisoner was on temporary release on election day, and registered
to vote, they were legally entitled to do so (McDermott, 2000, p. 335). 
Supreme Court rejects prisoner voting 
Two years after the passing of the Electoral Act 1992 the Irish Courts
rejected an application from a prisoner, Patrick Holland, to suspend the
European Parliament elections to allow him to pursue constitutional
proceedings because he was denied the facility to vote (Hamilton and
Lines, 2009, pp. 209–10). He pursued the case to the European
Commis sion of Human Rights (ECmHR), where the Irish government
maintained that there was no constitutional or convention guarantee of a
postal vote. It argued that it would be impractical to have hundreds of
ballot boxes in prisons throughout the country to facilitate prisoners
from different constituencies, and it was too much of a security risk and
a burden on the Prison Service to allow the release of all prisoners to
vote. 
In rejecting the application, the ECmHR felt bound to conclude that: 
the legislator, in the exercise of its margin of appreciation, may restrict
the right to vote in respect of convicted persons. Such restrictions
could, in the Commission’s opinion, be explained by the notion of
dishonour that certain convictions carry with them for a specific
period. (Holland v Ireland, 1998)
Accordingly, the Commission concluded that the suspension of the right
to vote was not arbitrary and did not contravene Article 3 of Protocol No.
1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which binds
signatories to ‘hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot,
under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of
the people in the choice of the legislature’.
Two years after the Holland judgment, the High Court ruled in the
Breathnach case that prisoners retained the right to vote under the
Electoral Act 1992. The court declared that the failure of the state to pro -
vide a means whereby a prisoner could vote breached the constitutional
guarantee of equality before the law. It ruled that prisoners enjoyed a
right, which had been conferred on them by the constitution, to vote at
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elections for members of Dáil Éireann, and no legislation was currently
in force that removed or limited that right. Drawing on European human
rights standards, Mr Justice Quirke stated that not providing the
necessary machinery to enable Breathnach to exercise his right to vote: 
comprises a failure which unfairly discriminates against him and (a)
fails to vindicate the right conferred upon him by article 40.1 of the
Constitution of Ireland to be held equal before the law and; (b) fails to
vindicate the right conferred upon him by article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights to vote in national and local elections
without discrimination by reason of his status. (Breathnach v Ireland,
2000)
During the hearing the state had acknowledged that the extension of
postal voting to prisoners would not impose undue administrative
demands, but Justice Quirke noted that no legislative provisions existed
for such a facility. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned this
judgment. The Supreme Court ruled that while prisoners were detained
in accordance with the law, some of their constitutional rights, including
voting, were suspended. ‘It is of course clear’, Chief Justice Ronan Keane
concluded, that ‘despite the deprivation of his liberty which is the
necessary consequence of the terms of imprisonment imposed upon him,
the applicant retains the right to vote and could exercise that right if
polling day in a particular election or referendum happened to coincide
with a period when he was absent from the prison on temporary leave’
(Breathnach v Ireland, 2001). After outlining the jurisprudence, Susan
Denham, future Chief Justice, ruled that imprisonment was only part of
the punishment. 
The applicant [Stiofán Breathnach] is in a special category of person –
he is in lawful custody. His rights are consequently affected. The
applicant is in the same situation as all prisoners: there is no provision
enabling any prisoners to vote. Consequently, there is no inequality as
between prisoners. The inequality as between a free person and a
person lawfully in prison arises as a matter of law. It is a consequence
of lawful custody that certain rights of the prisoner are curtailed,
lawfully. Many constitutional rights are suspended as a result of the
lawful deprivation of liberty. It is a consequence of a lawful order not
an arbitrary decision. (Breathnach v Ireland, 2001)
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Oireachtas enfranchises prisoners 
The Supreme Court had set out the constitutional position. With
government politicians reluctant to champion the rights of prisoners, and
clarification provided by the courts, it seemed the matter was closed.
However, despite the Supreme Court judgment, there continued to be
some muted debate about the enfranchisement of prisoners. In 2002, a
report from the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) on the
reintegration of prisoners recommended that the Department of Justice,
and the Prison Service, should ‘develop a Charter of Prisoner Rights
(including consideration of extending voting rights to prisoners)’ (NESF,
2002, p. 71). In 2005 Opposition TD, Gay Mitchell, proposed a private
member’s bill on prisoner enfranchisement. With the possibility of this
bill being discussed in the Oireachtas, the Tánaiste, Mary Harney, told
the Dáil that the ‘Government has cleared the legislation to provide for
prisoners’ voting by way of a postal ballot in their own constituencies’
(Dáil Debates, 2005, vol. 612, col. 1115). 
In December 2006, the Oireachtas passed the Electoral (Amendment)
Act to allow prisoners to vote by postal ballot. The legislation to
enfranchise prisoners was introduced by a coalition government of
Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats, neither known for their
liberal attitude to prisoners, and the former party responsible for
popularising ‘zero tolerance’ discourse in the Irish political lexicon
(O’Donnell and O’Sullivan, 2003). 
Introducing the Electoral (Amendment) Bill to the Dáil, the Minister
for Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Dick Roche, stated
that the legislation would modernise existing electoral law and meet the
government’s obligations under the provisions of the European
Convention on Human Rights, which had been incorporated into Irish
law in 2003 (Egan, 2003). Referring to the Hirst judgment (see next
section), he argued that while the legal position in the UK differed
significantly from Ireland, ‘in light of the judgment it is appropriate,
timely and prudent to implement new arrangements to give practical
effect to prisoner voting in Ireland’ (Dáil Debates, 2006, vol. 624, col.
1978). 
During the Oireachtas debates on the bill, no parliamentarian spoke
against the enfranchisement of prisoners. Amendments were put forward
to make sure prisoners would have trust in the electoral process. Outside
parliament, there was little discussion about prisoners and enfranchise -
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ment in the lead-up to, or during, the passing of the legislation. In stark
contrast to the role played (especially by the tabloid press) elsewhere,
particularly when it comes to the issues of crime and prisoners’ rights,
the Irish media was remarkably silent on the legislation, with very few
newspapers even mentioning it (Behan and O’Donnell, 2008). 
The Irish government decided to introduce legislation to allow
prisoner voting, even though neither the prison population nor the
general public were clamouring for it, the courts did not require it and
little political capital could be expected in return. The passing of the
legislation to enfranchise prisoners in the Republic of Ireland went
against the international trend in recent years, as ‘much prison policy
strengthens the “criminal” as an identity rather than an incarcerated
“citizen”’ (Stern, 2002, p. 137). Nevertheless, perhaps equally significant
was the lack of controversy among policymakers, politicians and media
compared to other jurisdictions. 
Advocated as an electoral rather than a criminal justice reform and
with no legislation to be repealed, it was easier to introduce a relatively
minor piece of legislation. It also did not use up any political capital for
the minister initiating the measure. So with a minister with responsibility
for the franchise professing electoral reform as a priority, this progressive
piece of legislation passed quietly through the Oireachtas. This stands in
stark contrast to the experience in the United Kingdom. 
United Kingdom
Outside of the United States of America (Manza and Uggen, 2006), no
country in the world has been as concerned by prisoner enfranchisement
as the United Kingdom (Easton, 2011). It has been contested in the
courts (both domestic and European), considered in a number of
consultative processes, debated in parliament and had a parliamentary
committee established specifically to consider the subject. At the time of
writing, the issue has not been settled and prisoner enfranchisement
remains a matter of some controversy. 
When the United Kingdom increased the franchise threefold with the
Representation of the People Act 1918, the Forfeiture Act 1870 still
barred from voting anyone sentenced to over 12 months. Effectively all
prisoners were disenfranchised because they were unable to register, as
they were not in a position to attend polling stations (Murray, 2013, 
pp. 515–16). While various electoral acts mentioned prisoners, the
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Representation of the People Act 1983 stated explicitly that a ‘convicted
person during the time that he is detained in a penal institution in
pursuance of his sentence is legally incapable of voting at any
parliamentary or local government election’. As there was no facility to
allow them to vote, all prisoners (whatever their status) were in effect
excluded from the franchise. This was amended to allow remand
prisoners to vote with the Representation of the People Act 2000. 
George Howarth MP, for the Home Office, stated that while the
legislation was being amended to allow remand prisoners to register to
vote, ‘it should be part of a convicted prisoner’s punishment that he loses
rights and one of them is the right to vote’ (Hansard, HC Debates, 15
December 1999, vol. 341, col. 300).
ECtHR rejects blanket ban on prisoner voting 
In 1998, the Human Rights Act incorporated the ECHR into United
Kingdom law. Three years later, the High Court rejected an application
from three prisoners that denying them the vote contravened their rights
under the ECHR. Lord Justice Kennedy concluded that ‘there would
seem to be no reason why Parliament should not, if so minded, in its dual
role as legislator in relation to sentencing and as guardian of its
institutions, order that certain consequences shall follow upon conviction
or incarceration’ (Pearson and Martinez v Secretary of State for the Home
Department EWHC [2001] Admin 239).
One of those involved in the case, John Hirst, appealed and in March
2004, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that there
had been a breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR. The rights
to vote and participate in elections are ‘central to democracy and the rule
of law’, the court ruled, but it conceded that ‘they are not absolute and
may be subject to limitations’. However, it rejected as ‘arbitrary’ and
‘disproportionate’ a ban on all convicted prisoners. It accepted that while
this is ‘an area in which a wide margin of appreciation should be granted
to the national legislature … It cannot accept however that an absolute
ban on voting by any serving prisoner in any circumstances falls within
an acceptable margin of appreciation’ (Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 1),
2004). In effect, the court decided that some prisoners in the United
Kingdom had their human rights contravened by being denied the vote.
The UK government appealed to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR
on the basis that under the ECHR the right to vote was not absolute.
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Convicted prisoners, it argued, forfeited the right to take part in deciding
who should govern as they had ‘breached the social contract’. The
government claimed that disqualification would achieve the aims of
preventing crime, punishing offenders, and enhancing civic responsibility
and respect for the rule of law by ‘depriving those who had breached the
basic rules of society of the right to have a say in the way such rules 
were made’. Disenfranchisement only affected those who had been 
given a custodial sentence and, thus, the duration was ‘accordingly fixed
by the court at the time of sentencing’ (Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2),
2005). 
In October 2005, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, by a margin of
12 votes to five, found against the British government. While the Grand
Chamber accepted that each signatory to the ECHR must be allowed a
margin of appreciation, ‘the right to vote is not a privilege’. The
automatic blanket ban lacked proportionality and encompassed those
who served from one day to life in prison, from those who were convicted
of minor to the most serious offences. Rejecting the UK government’s
argument that parliamentary approval had been given for this measure,
the Grand Chamber ruled: ‘It cannot be said that there were any
substantive debates by members of the legislature on the continued
justification in light of modern-day penal policy and human rights
standards for maintaining such a general restriction on the right of
prisoners to vote’. As for the plea from the UK government that the lower
court’s ‘finding of a violation was a surprising result, and offensive to
many people’, Judge Calfisch remarked that ‘decisions taken by the court
are not made to please … members of the public but to uphold human
rights principles’ (Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005). 
Resisting enfranchisement I: Executive 
In December 2006, in response to the court’s judgment and the criticism
of lack of substantive debate on prisoner enfranchisement, the UK
government issued a consultation paper (DCA, 2006). Lord Falconer,
the Lord Chancellor, continued to argue that the loss of the vote ‘is a
proper and proportionate punishment for breaches of the social contract
that resulted in imprisonment’. Successive governments held that the
‘right to vote forms part of the social contract between individuals and
the state’ (DCA, 2006, Foreword). The consultation document laid out a
number of options: retain the current ban on voting rights for convicted
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prisoners; enfranchise prisoners sentenced to less than a specified term;
allow sentencers to decide on withdrawal of the franchise; or enfranchise
all tariff-expired life sentence prisoners (DCA, 2006, pp. 23–5).
The government had completed the first phase of the consultation
process by March 2007, and in April 2009 it launched the second stage
after giving ‘careful consideration’ to how to respond to the ECtHR
judgment. By this stage, the government had reached ‘the preliminary
conclusion that to meet the terms of the judgment a limited
enfranchisement of convicted prisoners in custody should take place’
(Ministry of Justice, 2009, p. 21). Postal voting was the most likely
mechanism, with prisoners declaring a ‘local connection’, and eligibility
would be based on sentence length. This consultation paper put forward
four options – those sentenced to less than one, two, or four years would
retain the right to vote. The final option was that those sentenced to two
years or under would automatically retain the right to vote and prisoners
who received a sentence of between two and four years could apply to
vote, but only where a judge allowed it. The government was nevertheless
‘inclined towards the lower end of the spectrum of these options’ and the
seriousness of the offence should determine eligibility to vote. But ‘no
prisoners sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment would be eligible to vote’
(Ministry of Justice, 2009, p. 25). 
Despite repeated criticism of the UK government from the Council of
Europe’s Committee of Ministers (see White, 2013, pp. 20–1), a general
election took place in May 2010 without any measures to include
prisoners in the franchise. While the Liberal Democrats had previously
voiced support for prisoner voting (White, 2013), their coalition partner
and Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron, set the tone for the
new coalition government’s position: ‘It makes me physically ill even to
contemplate having to give the vote to anyone who is in prison. Frankly,
when people commit a crime and go to prison, they should lose their
rights, including the right to vote.’ However, he conceded that some
prisoners would have to be enfranchised, because of pending litigation by
prisoners, ‘painful as it is’ (Hansard, HC Debates, 3 November 2010, vol.
517, col. 921). 
Resisting enfranchisement II: Parliament
In February 2011, a backbench debate was held on prisoner enfranchise -
ment which the initiators hoped would satisfy one of the ECtHR’s
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rulings, that the lack of political discussion undermined the legitimacy of
disenfranchisement. The debate was proposed by high-ranking members
of the Conservative and Labour parties. David Davis, Conservative MP,
believed that there ‘have been many important debates in this slot, but I
lay claim to this one being unique, because it gives this House – not the
Government – the right to assert its own right to make a decision on
something of very great democratic importance, and to return that
decision to itself ’. He suggested there were two different issues at stake:
firstly, the right of the ECtHR or the UK parliament to decide on the
matter and secondly, voting rights for prisoners. While rejecting
European interference on the matter, he took up the latter subject. He
supported the concept that ‘if you break the law, you cannot make the
law’. If a crime is serious enough for a perpetrator to be sent to prison, ‘a
person has broken their contract with society to such a serious extent that
they have lost all these rights: their liberty, their freedom of association
and their right to vote’ (Hansard, HC Debates, 10 February 2011, vol.
523, col. 494). 
Former Labour Home Secretary Jack Straw was one of those who
proposed the motion. He asked whether ‘through the decision in the
Hirst case and some similar decisions, the Strasbourg Court is setting
itself up as a supreme court for Europe with an ever-widening remit’
(Hansard, HC Debates, 10 February 2011, vol. 523, col. 502). After
much discussion, the House of Commons noted the Hirst ruling and by a
majority of 234 to 22 passed a motion acknowledging the ‘treaty
obligations of the UK’, but believed that ‘legislative decisions of this
nature should be a matter for democratically elected lawmakers; and [the
House] supports the current situation in which no sentenced prisoner is
able to vote except those imprisoned for contempt, default or on remand’
(Hansard, HC Debates, 10 February 2011, vol. 523, col. 586). Despite
the House of Commons giving its answer to the ECtHR, it was still up to
the government to respond to the Hirst judgment. 
After the Hirst judgment, a number of countries introduced legislation
to enfranchise some or all prisoners, including the Republic of Ireland,
Cyprus, Belgium and Moldova (White, 2013, pp. 45–57). Subsequently,
the ECtHR heard similar cases on prisoner voting (Frodl v Austria and
Scoppola v Italy). While these cases were ongoing, the UK government
was allowed more time to respond to Hirst. Finally, after the ruling of
Scoppola v Italy in May 2012, the UK government was given another six
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months by the ECtHR after it was reminded that ‘the Court has
repeatedly affirmed that the margin in this area is wide’ (Scoppola v Italy,
2012). 
On 22 November 2012, over seven years after the Hirst judgment and
just over 24 hours before the deadline set by the ECtHR, the UK
government introduced the Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Draft Bill. The
bill, to be considered by a committee of both Houses of Parliament,
proposed three options: prisoners sentenced to less than four years would
be allowed to vote; prisoners sentenced to less than six months would
retain the franchise; and the final option – a restatement of the existing
ban on voting for all sentenced prisoners. In his statement to the House
of Commons, the Justice Secretary, Chris Grayling, argued that the court
had gone beyond the original intention of the ECHR. He was giving
parliament the authority to consider the bill as its response to the
ECtHR, because, while he recognised that it was his ‘obligation to
uphold the rule of law seriously … Equally, it remains the case that
Parliament is sovereign’ (Hansard, HC Debates, 22 November 2012, vol.
553, col. 745). While he would ask a parliamentary committee to con -
sider legislative proposals, ‘Ultimately, if this Parliament decides not to
agree to rulings from the ECtHR, it has no sanction. It can apply fines in
absentia, but it will be for Parliament to decide whether it wishes to
recognize those decisions’ (Hansard, HC Debates, 22 November 2012,
vol. 553, col. 754). Nevertheless, he was conscious that there was a case
to be heard in the Supreme Court in summer 2013 on the right to vote in
European elections and the nearly 3,000 cases taken by prisoners for
compensation, which were on hold pending implementation of the
judgment. 
The Labour Party supported the government’s approach. This was,
according to Shadow Justice Spokesman, Sadiq Khan, ‘not a case of our
Government failing to hold free or fair elections, or an issue of massive
electoral fraud; it is a case of offenders, sent to prison by judges, being
denied the right and the privilege of voting, as they are denied other
rights and privileges’ (Hansard, HC Debates, 22 November 2012, vol.
553, col. 746–7). As a draft bill is published to enable consultation and
pre-legislative scrutiny, it can take years to reach the statute books. This
move by the government was seen by some commentators as an attempt
to play for time with the ECtHR and the Council of Ministers of the
Council of Europe (Rozenberg, 2012; Jenkins, 2012). Nevertheless, the
UK government could legitimately argue that it had brought forward
legislative proposals and it was now for parliament to decide. 
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While this bill was being considered, another case came before the UK
Supreme Court when prisoners challenged their right to vote under EU
law. This was rejected by the Supreme Court because it considered
eligibility to vote under EU law as a matter for national parliaments. Lord
Mance ruled that relevant EU treaties were concerned with ‘ensuring
equal treatment between EU citizens residing in member states other
than that of their nationality, and so safeguarding freedom of movement
within the EU’. Lord Sumption echoed this: ‘In any democracy, the
franchise will be determined by domestic laws which will define those
entitled to vote in more or less inclusive terms.’ He believed that the
Strasbourg court had ‘arrived at a very curious position’, concluding that
‘Wherever the threshold for imprisonment is placed, it seems to have
been their view that there must always be some offences which are
serious enough to warrant imprisonment but not serious enough to
warrant disenfranchisement. Yet the basis of this view is nowhere
articulated’ (R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice and McGeoch v
Lord President [2013] UKSC 63). 
Meanwhile, the Joint Select Committee on Draft Voting Eligibility
(Prisoners) Bill began taking oral evidence in April 2013. At the opening
session, chair of the committee, Nick Gibb MP, explained that ‘All the
main parties in the UK, and the vast majority of Members of Parliament
and the public, are opposed to allowing prisoners to vote’. However, the
committee would ‘examine these issues in great depth, to form a view
about the draft Bill and to consider how the public’s position on this issue
can be squared with that of the European Court of Human Rights’. 
The committee believed that the vote should ‘not be removed without
good reason’, but argued that those guilty of ‘heinous crimes’ should be
disenfranchised. After considering a range of evidence from a wide range
of organisations and individuals (including this author), the majority
report (with dissension from three members, including the chair)
recommended enfranchising prisoners serving 12 months or less and that
those with longer sentences should be entitled to apply for registration
six months before their scheduled release date (Report of the Joint
Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill 2013, pp.
62–3). It recommended that a bill to this effect be presented to
parliament during the 2014–15 session. However, with no mention of
prisoner enfranchisement in the Queen’s Speech setting out the
legislative agenda for the 2014–15 parliamentary session, it is unlikely
that the bill, even if introduced, will pass all parliamentary stages in time
for the next general election in 2015. 
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Penal policy, politics and enfranchisement 
Despite their close proximity and similar legal and political traditions, the
approach to prisoner enfranchisement was significantly different in the
Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. This section will consider
whether this indicates something deeper about levels of punitiveness,
penal policy and the treatment of prisoners. While ‘law and order’
language may have become more punitive in the Republic of Ireland
(Rogan, 2013; O’Donnell and O’Sullivan, 2003) in recent decades, this
rhetoric had a greater impact on the discussions about prisoner
enfranchisement and, more generally, prisoners’ rights in the UK (Drake
and Henley, 2014). 
Other differences that influenced the debates were attitude to
European influences, media interest and the political dynamic behind the
issue. The courts in the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom
were in agreement that prisoner disenfranchisement was a political rather
than a legal matter, and should be left to legislators to decide. Therefore,
to allow or deny prisoners access to the ballot box was, in both states,
down to politics and policy. 
Despite diverging in their approach to prisoner enfranchisement, the
two states were similar in terms of imprisonment rates, treatment of
prisoners, and conditions of confinement (Bell, 2013; Rogan, 2013).
While it is recognised that using imprisonment rates to determine
punitiveness is fraught with difficulty (Pease, 1994; Ruggiero and Ryan,
2013), the two states have experienced a similar upward trajectory in the
numbers incarcerated in the past two decades. In England and Wales, the
number increased from 45,817 (90 per 100,000) in 1992 to 84,977 (149
per 100,000) in 2014. The prison population in Northern Ireland, having
dropped significantly in the wake of the prisoner releases under the Good
Friday Agreement, is at a similar level to 1992. In Scotland, the number
of prisoners increased from 5,257 (103 prisoners per 100,000) in 1992
to 7,797 (146 per 100,000) in 2014. Imprisonment rates went in a
similar direction in the Republic of Ireland, rising from 2,185 (61 per
100,000) in 1992 to 4,104 (89 per 100,000) by 2014 (International
Centre for Prison Studies, 2014). 
Old, inadequate prison estate, overcrowding and poor conditions
characterise the prison systems of England and Wales and the Republic of
Ireland (Bell, 2013; Jesuit Centre for Faith and Justice (JCFJ), 2012).
Despite enfranchisement, conditions in prisons in the Republic of
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Ireland remained unchanged. The practice of ‘slopping out’, condemned
regularly by both national and European reports (Committee for the
Prevention of Torture, 2011; Inspector of Prisons, 2009a), was still in
operation in the older prisons, with the ‘great majority’ who did not have
access to proper toilet facilities having to share a cell (JCFJ, 2012, p. 29).
While legislators concerned themselves with prisoner enfranchisement,
prison rules dated from 1947;2 the Inspector of Prisons, established in
2002, had yet to be put on a statutory footing; and prisoners had no
access to the Ombudsman, or a designated Prisoner Ombudsman, which
even the government-appointed Inspector of Prisons pointed out ‘seems
to suggest a lacuna in the system’ (Inspector of Prisons, 2009b, p. 37).
The UK had a more robust system of oversight and monitoring (Owers,
2006).
Plans have been announced to tackle some deficiencies in Irish prison
oversight and to make improvements in the Irish prison estate –
especially the ending of ‘slopping out’ in Ireland’s largest prison,
Mountjoy. Nevertheless, the practice of ‘slopping out’ and overcrowding
was still blighting the Irish penal landscape during this period of electoral
reform. The lack of penal reform was cited by many prisoners as one of
the reasons for abstaining from voting in the 2007 general election
(Behan, 2012).
The Irish discussion about prisoner voting was intertwined with the
debate around creating the ‘responsible’ prisoner. During the debates on
enfranchisement, politicians were keen to stress that this legislation could
be used to rehabilitate prisoners and encourage them to behave more
responsibly and appreciate the implications of citizenship (Behan, 2012).
In 2007, the Irish Prison Service (IPS) mission was to help ‘prisoners
develop their sense of responsibility’ and to enable them ‘to return to live
as a law abiding member of the wider community having reduced the risk
to society of further offending’ (IPS, 2001, p. 34). Voting, it was hoped,
would become part of the process of developing a pro-social, responsible
identity. 
However, policies that seek to encourage prisoners to behave
responsibly are not confined to Ireland. The Council of Europe (2006,
Rule 102) suggests that ‘the regime for prisoners shall be designed to
enable them to lead a responsible and crime-free life’. The ‘rehabilitated’
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and ‘responsible’ prisoner has come into vogue in international prison
policy and management (see Bosworth, 2007; Crewe, 2012; Garland,
2001). The concept of individual responsibility pervades prison manage -
ment discourse internationally (Bosworth, 2007) and reflects the wider
drive towards responsibilisation that is characteristic of attempts to
respond to crime in late modern societies (Garland, 2001). It is also
prevalent in attitudes to prisoners in the United Kingdom (Crewe,
2012). However, clouded in other political issues, the discussion in the
UK did not get as far as discussing enfranchisement as a way of
encouraging prisoners to behave responsibly. 
The deliberations on prisoner enfranchisement revealed very different
attitudes to European standards, conventions and institutions. In the
Republic of Ireland, the discourse around ‘Europe’ was generally
positive, emphasising European jurisprudence and human rights
standards (see Griffin and O’Donnell, 2012) and the desire to locate
Ireland in a progressive European setting. Indicating a much more
positive tone towards the Hirst judgment, Dick Roche believed that 
there was ‘an obligation under the European Convention of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which guarantees the right to vote’,
and there ‘is a moral responsibility on member states that if you sign 
the Charter, you abide by the Charter’. While recognising that 
Ireland’s position was different from that of the UK, he thought it was
‘better to deal with it at our pace, of our own volition than have a
challenge to us in the Court of Human Rights’ (interview with author,
November 2007). 
In the UK, discussion around European influences has been
somewhat negative. The debate on prisoner enfranchisement has been
framed primarily around powers and jurisdiction of ‘Europe’ and its
institutions. Many politicians and commentators rather carelessly
intermingled discussion about the Council of Europe and the European
Union, either unaware or unconcerned that it was a Council of Europe
rather than an EU court that ruled in Hirst. In the February 2011
backbench debate, Bernard Jenkin, Conservative MP, suggested that
votes for prisoners ‘was never an issue in the British prison system until
the lawyers got hold of it through the European Convention on Human
Rights, and to that extent it is completely irrelevant to the real issues that
face our prison system and the prisoners in it’ (Hansard, HC Debates, 10
February 2011, vol. 523, col. 494). While David Cameron personally
believed that prisoners should lose the right to vote, ‘it should be a matter
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for Parliament to decide, not a foreign court’ (Hansard, HC Debates, 23
May 2012, vol. 545, col. 1127). 
Combined with the hostility towards what was deemed European
interference was an argument that this was a case of judicial activism.
One Conservative MP believed that prisoner voting was ‘fabricated by
judicial innovation contrary to the express terms of the ECHR’ by the
‘Strasbourg Court’ (Rabb, 2011, p. xiii). He believed that the UK
government should inform the ECtHR that it ‘cannot – rather than it will
not – enact legislation to give prisoners the vote, in light of the contrary
express will of parliament’ (Rabb, 2011, p. 31; emphasis in original).
During a previous parliamentary debate, the Conservative peer Lord
Tebbit railed against ‘judicial imperialism, to which we are becoming
accustomed’. He argued that the British people through ‘the Parliament
of this Kingdom has not yet been invited to give its view on this matter’
(Hansard, HL Debates, 20 April 2009, vol. 709, col. 1248). As Yasmin
Qureshi MP pointed out, the debate began about whether prisoners
should have the right to vote, ‘but it seems to have been turned into an
opportunity to bash the European Court of Human Rights’ (Hansard,
HC Debates, 10 February 2011, vol. 523, col. 535). 
Politicians in the UK claimed to be following the public mood in
resisting enfranchisement, perhaps reflecting a more embedded ‘populist
punitiveness’, which conveys ‘the notion of politicians tapping into, and
using for their purposes, what they believe to be the public’s generally
punitive stance’ (Bottoms, 1995, p. 40). In October 2005, in the wake of
the Hirst judgment, the Manchester Evening News found that 74% of
respondents in its poll were against giving prisoners the right to vote
(Easton, 2011, p. 220). Five years later, 76% of respondents believed that
prisoners should not be allowed to vote. Only 17% believed that they
should retain the right to exercise their franchise (YouGov/The Sun,
2010).
In another sign of widespread political rejection of Hirst, the Scottish
parliament in preparation for the referendum on independence in 2014
passed the Scottish Independence (Referendum) Bill, which included a
clause banning convicted prisoners from voting. The Scottish
government relied on legal advice that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the
ECHR applied only to elections, not to referenda. The Scottish National
Party, as it made much of its desire to widen the franchise to include 16-
and 17-year-olds, sought to limit voting eligibility with the exclusion of
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prisoners: Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon argued that the
government was ‘not persuaded’ of the case for allowing convicted
prisoners to vote (cited in Robertson, 2013, p. 44). 
The lack of media interest in the Republic of Ireland (even in Irish
editions of UK tabloids) is in stark contrast to much of the comment in
the tabloid press in the UK (Behan and O’Donnell, 2008, p. 328). In the
latter, the debate was constructed around the argument that giving
prisoners the right to vote would be an attack on victims’ rights, with
many papers coming out against prisoners’ access to the franchise (Drake
and Henley, 2014). In reporting the launch of the second consultation
process in 2009, the Daily Express in an outraged front page article
suggested: ‘Europe Says: Give Votes to Convicts’ (Milland, 2009). It
reported that: ‘Thousands of rapists, killers and paedophiles will get the
right to vote after ministers caved in to pressure from Europe.’ This was
the perfect storm of a story for some sections of the media, combining
the ‘law and order’ issue with European interference and judicial
activism. 
In the Republic of Ireland, in contrast to most other jurisdictions,
prisoner enfranchisement was framed as an electoral rather than a penal
reform issue. During the early years of the twenty-first century, the Irish
government proclaimed its desire to create a more progressive electoral
system, and voting for prisoners was one such measure, along with a
much criticised and subsequently abandoned introduction of electronic
voting. Mary Rogan (2013, p. 106) has argued that ‘it is difficult to state
what precisely is the particular ideology – or political or penal philosophy
– driving change within Irish penal policy’. She suggests that a
‘confluence of factors must be examined’ and ‘individual ministers and
civil servants have enormous influence’. Although it is not a criminal
justice measure, the role of the minister in charge of the franchise had a
considerable bearing. Dick Roche professed himself personally
committed to, and publicly extolled, electoral reform. As a former
Chairman of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace, he believed that
prisoner enfranchisement was ‘intrinsically the right thing’. He thought
that ‘every citizen has the right to vote, even citizens that found
themselves locked up’. So at minimal cost, with no political and media
opposition, and an eye to Europe, Dick Roche believed it was ‘one of
those serendipitous moments’ and concluded: ‘it just struck me that we
had an opportunity to introduce this and the sky didn’t fall down’
(interview with author, November 2007). 
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Conclusion
While the debates on the introduction of legislation to allow prisoners to
vote in the Republic of Ireland made reference to the international
situation, the impetus for reform was more complex and local. In
contrast to many other jurisdictions, where ‘disenfranchisement is a
punitive sanction’ (Uggen et al., 2012, p. 64), the Republic of Ireland had
legislation specifically setting out the practicalities of registration, making
enfranchisement easier to legislate for rather than having to repeal other
legislation. With no political or media opposition and at little cost, this
eased the passage of legislation and did not need to use up any political
capital.
In an attempt perhaps to avoid possible political fallout, those who
introduced the legislation reminded prisoners of their responsibilities
and the obligations of citizenship, while reassuring the general public of
their abhorrence of crime. This short piece of enabling legislation allowed
a measure that has been controversial in many other jurisdictions to be
passed relatively unnoticed in political or public discourse. In contrast,
prisoner enfranchisement in the United Kingdom has been intertwined
in the wider discourse around European influence, judicial activism and
a zero-sum dichotomy between prisoners’ and victims’ rights. Politicians
both used and played to media hostility towards ‘European interference’.
At the time of writing, the debate is ongoing and perhaps the UK
government will introduce legislation to allow some prisoners to vote, not
because it wants to, but rather to remain uncensured within the Council
of Europe or to avoid the potential of compensation for prisoners. 
Despite similarities in legal and political traditions, the Republic of
Ireland and the United Kingdom have taken very different approaches to
prisoner enfranchisement. Rising levels of imprisonment and conditions
of confinement were somewhat similar in the two states. Nevertheless,
even with enfranchisement, penal policy remained unchanged in the
Republic of Ireland. More than revealing differences in penal policy or
approaches to criminal justice, the deliberations on prisoner
enfranchisement indicated significant distinctions in the role of the
media and a marked divergence in attitudes to European influences,
judicial activism and parliamentary sovereignty among governments and
legislatures in the Republic of Ireland and United Kingdom. These
issues, along with those concerning penal and criminal justice policies,
may help us understand why legislators in the Republic of Ireland
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embraced prisoner enfranchisement and their counterparts in the United
Kingdom continue to resist enfranchisement of its confined citizens.
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